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The Korea-U.S. Free Trade Agreement (KORUS FTA) and 
the Korea-European Union Free Trade Agreement (Korea-
EU FTA) are the major FTAs for the Korean economy. 
Although both FTAs share many similarities, there exist 
various differences between these FTAs. The objective of 
this paper is to identify the differences in the KORUS and 
Korea-EU FTAs in the areas of access to the Korean market 
in agriculture, fisheries, manufacturing, and services. This 
paper also compares the treatment of the Kaesong industrial 
complex (KIC) in both FTAs. The main finding of this paper 
is that, although the United States and the EU treat services 
and the KIC similarly, the United States was able to negotiate 
more advantageous terms in animal and vegetable products 
and transportation. Meanwhile the EU received more favor-
able treatment in the areas of processed foodstuffs, fishery 
products, chemicals, machinery, and electronics. This paper 
provides an explanation of these differences and derives 
implications for U.S. exporters from the delay of the imple-
mentation of the KORUS FTA.
Introduction
The KORUS FTA and the Korea-EU FTA epitomize the 
change in the trade policy of Korea. The Korean economy 
has benefited from the multilateral trading system and has 
been a longtime supporter of multilateralism. As regionalism 
emerged as a new axis of the global trade system in the 1990s, 
however, Korea began to engage in establishing FTAs. Since 
the inauguration of the Korea-Chile FTA in April 2004, Ko-
rean FTAs with Singapore, the European Free Trade Associa-
tion (EFTA), and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations 
(ASEAN) have entered into force. But the KORUS FTA and 
the Korea-EU FTA are the FTAs that Korea concluded with 
major trade partners with advanced economies.
The United States is the fourth-largest importing and the 
third-largest exporting partner for Korea. U.S. exports to 
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Korea currently face an average tariff of 12.2 percent—49 per-
cent for agricultural products and 6.6 percent for nonagricultural 
products. Nearly 95 percent of bilateral trade in consumer and 
industrial products will become duty-free within three years of 
the implementation of the KORUS FTA. Most remaining tariffs 
will be eliminated within 10 years. Only for some highly sensi-
tive products will the tariff phase-out last for up to 20 years. 
Agricultural products, by value almost two-thirds of Korea’s 
imports from the United States, will become duty-free imme-
diately after the FTA’s entry into force.1
The Korea-EU FTA is the world’s biggest free trade deal since 
1994. In total, the 27 EU countries are the third-largest importing 
and the second-largest exporting partners of Korea. Like the 
KORUS FTA, the Korea-EU FTA is very comprehensive. It 
will reduce and eliminate tariffs as well as other trade barriers 
in agriculture, manufacturing, and services. It also covers trade-
related activities such as government procurement, intellectual 
rights, labor rights, and environmental issues. Once enacted, 
98.7 percent of EU-Korea commerce will be tariff-free within 
five years.2
The KORUS FTA and the Korea-EU FTA have similarities and 
differences. Even though both are comprehensive agreements 
and in many aspects are similar, some differences exist. For ex-
ample, the percentage of Korean tariffs that will be eliminated in 
three years after the enforcement is 92 percent in the Korea-EU 
FTA while it is 94.5 percent in the KORUS FTA. The objective 
of this paper is to identify the differences in the KORUS and 
Korea-EU FTAs from the perspective of Korean market access 
and to provide an explanation of the differences of these two 
from the perspective of trade structure and bargaining power of 
each party exercised in the FTA negotiations.
For this purpose, the next section compares the Korean tariff 
schedules in two FTAs in the areas of agriculture, fisheries, and 
manufacturing and also addresses how Korea agreed to further 
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Table 1: Korea’s Proposed Tariff Reductions in the KORUS FTA and the Korea-EU FTA 
 
HS code1 Descriptions 
Percentage of items 
that differ when 
KORUS FTA and 
Korea-EU FTA are 
compared 
Percentage of items 
that Korea will 
import duty-free 
after FTAs enter 
into force 
01, 02, 04, 05 Animal and animal products 24.0 27.7 
03 Fish and crustaceans 50.5 5.1 
06–15 Vegetable products 21.2 36.3 
16–24 Foodstuffs 25.1 18.5 
25–27 Mineral products 6.4 91.6 
28–38 Chemicals and allied industries 7.7 88.0 
39–40 Plastics and rubber 20.3 75.7 
41–43 Raw hides, skins, leather, and furs 12.3 87.3 
44–49 Wood and wood products 17.7 61.1 
50–63 Textiles 2.5 97.5 
64–67 Footwear and headgear 1.9 98.1 
68–71 Stone and glass 17.0 81.5 
72–83 Metals 8.3 90.4 
84–85 Machinery and electrical 11.9 83.9 
86–89 Transportation 23.4 75.7 
90–97 Miscellaneous 10.8 83.1 
 
Source: Author calculations that are based on Korean tariff schedules in both FTAs. 
1 HS code = Harmonized Commodity Description and Coding System. 
liberalize its services markets. The treatments of the KIC 
in both agreements are compared.3 The main finding of this 
paper is that the United States has more favorable negotia-
tions in animal and vegetable products and in the transpor-
tation sector, while the EU has more favorable results in 
processed food, fisheries, chemicals and allied industries, 
and in the machinery and electrical sectors. This paper also 
derives implications for U.S. exporters from the delay of the 
implementation of the KORUS FTA.
KORUS FTA Compared with the Korea-EU 
FTA
Korea’s tariff schedules in both FTAs are described on 
the basis of the Harmonized System of Republic of Korea 
(HSK). The HSK is the Korean version of the Harmonized 
Commodity Description and Coding System (HS) of tariff 
nomenclature, which is an internationally standardized sys-
tem of names and numbers for classifying traded products 
developed and maintained by the World Customs Organi-
zation. The HS sets forth all international nomenclature 
through a six-digit-level system. The HSK adds subdivisions, 
and it assigns four more digits to the HS, for a total of 10 at the 
tariff-rate line.
The HS is organized into 21 sections and 96 chapters.4 The 
system begins by assigning goods to categories of crude and 
natural products and from there proceeds to categories with 
increasing complexity. For the purpose of this paper, the 21 
sections are regrouped into 16 categories, as shown in Table 
1. The agriculture sector consists of the categories of animal 
and animal products, vegetable products, and foodstuffs. The 
fishery sector is represented by the category of fish and crusta-
ceans. Finally, the manufacturing sector is subdivided into 12 
categories of mineral products; chemical and allied industries; 
plastic and rubber; raw hides, skins, leather, and fur; wood 
and wood products; textiles; footwear and headgear; stone and 
glass; metals; machinery and electrical goods; transportation; 
and miscellaneous.
The fourth column of Table 1 reports the percentage of items in 
each category that Korea promises to import duty-free immedi-
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ately after the FTAs enter into force. This percentage repre-
sents the sensitivity of products as conceived by the Korean 
government. The fishery sector has the lowest immediate 
tariff reduction level, followed by the agriculture sector. This 
reaffirms the sensitivity of the fishery and agriculture sectors 
in Korea. Wood and wood products are the most sensitive 
among categories in the manufacturing sector.
The third column of Table 1 shows the percentage of items in 
each category that would be subject to different tariff reduc-
tion schedules set up by Korea in the KORUS FTA and the 
Korea-EU FTA. The Korean tariff liberalization schedules 
are most different in the fishery sector. The agriculture sec-
tor also shows many differences in Korea’s tariff reduction 
schedules for each FTA. Combining the percentages in the 
third and fourth columns of Table 1, we are able to identify 
which products are sensitive in Korea and how they were 
negotiated in the KORUS FTA and the Korea-EU FTA. The 
fishery and agriculture sectors are very sensitive in Korea, 
and that fact led to a high number of different outcomes in 
both FTAs. In the manufacturing sector, transportation, plas-
tics and rubber, and wood and wood products were products 
that were negotiated with high sensitivity. The least sensitive 
products include textiles, footwear and headgear, mineral 
products, and metals.
Table 1 provides a broad picture of how products were ne-
gotiated in the KORUS and Korea-EU FTAs. Now we will 
take each sector separately and identify differences in the 
FTAs. Then we will provide an analysis of whether the EU 
achieved a more favorable outcome than the United States 
in each sector. In doing so, we devise a number that we call 
the “total score.” This number is the result of summing up 
the one-year difference for each item5 in each of the 16 cat-
egories found in Korea’s tariff schedule in both the KORUS 
and Korea-EU FTAs. The total score is a way to represent 
how the sensitivity of Korean markets was considered in 
the Korea-EU FTA. A negative total score means that the 
EU had a favorable outcome in the sector. Other than tariffs, 
agricultural safeguard measures (ASG) and tariff rate quotas 
(TRQ) were also utilized in both FTA negotiations to protect 
the Korean market, especially in the agriculture and fishery 
sectors. To calculate the total score, we need to assign a 
number for each item that is covered by ASG, TRQ, or both. 
The number 1 is assigned if the EU had a less favorable result 
than the United States and a minus 1 otherwise.
Agriculture Sector
Agriculture has been the most sensitive sector in FTA 
negotiations in Korea. Table 2 provides a list of the most 
sensitive items in this sector and compares the negotiation 
results of the KORUS FTA with those of the Korea-EU FTA. 
The comparison shows that most sensitive items were treated 
similarly in both FTAs. However, the United States receives 
more favorable treatment in items such as maize and some 
categories of barley, beans, and pork.
Since most sensitive items in the agriculture sector are covered 
by ASG and TRQ, we need to compare how some specific 
items are protected by these measures in both FTAs and decide 
whether the EU achieves a favorable outcome. In doing so, we 
are able to assign a number to those items in order to calculate 
the total score that represents an assessment of the Korea-EU 
FTA negotiations.
Animal and animal products. This is a category of products 
that is highly protected in Korea. Most Korean tariff rates on 
goods in this category are more than 20 percent and, in some 
cases, reach 243 percent (for natural honey). Meat and dairy 
products are the main items in this category. Both the KORUS 
FTA and the Korea-EU FTA took similar approaches to provide 
liberalization schedules of the Korean market. For the case 
of meat products, ASG combined with tariffs supplement the 
protection of Korean markets. Meanwhile TRQ were widely 
utilized for dairy products. In this category, Korea provided more 
favorable market access to the United States than the EU.
Beef. Korea’s duty on beef is currently 40 percent.6 This rate 
will be phased out over 15 years for the United States and over 
16 years for the EU. In addition, ASG will protect the Korean 
beef market from U.S. imports for 15 years and from EU im-
ports for 16 years. However, the trigger level for the safeguard 
measure is more favorable to the United States. The first-year 
trigger point is, for example, 279,000 metric tons for the United 
States while it is 9,900 metric tons for the EU. The difference 
in trigger points reflects the beef trade volumes between Korea 
and United States and between Korea and the EU. In 2009, for 
instance, Korean beef imports from the United States were $273 
million while beef from EU amounted to less than $3,000.
Pork. Pork, like beef, is also a sensitive item in Korea. Korea’s 
duties on pork are 22.5 percent for fresh and chilled pork and 25 
percent for frozen pork. The Korean liberalization schedule for 
pork is also more favorable to the United States. For fresh and 
chilled pork, 22.5 percent of the Korean duty will be phased out 
over 10 years for U.S. pork exports and over 11 years for EU 
pork exports.7 These phase-out periods will be supplemented by 
ASG in both the KORUS and the Korea-EU FTAs. However, 
the trigger level is much more favorable to the United States. 
For example, the first-year trigger level for fresh pork imports 
is 8,250 metric tons for the United States compared with 163 
metric tons for the EU. Also, although the 25 percent duty on the 
belly part of frozen pork from the EU will be phased out over 
11 years, the duty on U.S. exports will be completely eliminated 
beginning on 1 January 2014.8 For fresh pork, the favorable 
trigger points in ASG for U.S. exports reflect the fact that U.S. 
exports of pork to Korea total more than $19 million compared 
with EU exports of less than $8 million in 2009. In the case of 
frozen pork, however, it seems that the lesser amount of U.S. 
exports led to a more favorable outcome in Korea.
Milk and cream powder products. These dairy products are 
highly protected in Korea.9 The current duty rates are either 
89 percent or 176 percent, depending on product subclassifica-
tion. Products in this category are subject to the TRQ, which 
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is favorable to the United States. The aggregate 5,000 
metric tons of goods originating in the United States in this 
category will be permitted to enter the Korean market free 
of customs duty beginning the first year when the KORUS 
FTA enters into force. The in-quota quantity increases by 
approximately 3 percent per year and reaches 5,628 metric 
tons in year five. After year five, it increases by 3 percent per 
year, compounded annually. This implies that, eventually, 
products in this category will enter into the Korean market 
free of duty.
In comparison, the aggregate 1,000 metric tons of goods in 
this category originating from the EU will enter the Korean 
market free of duty. This in-quota quantity will steadily in-
crease up to 1,512 metric tons in year 16. After that, in contrast 
with the U.S. case, it remains the same as the quantity in year 
16. Duties on goods entered in aggregate quantities in excess 
of the quantities will remain at base rates in both FTAs. U.S. 
exports in this category were $0.7 and $0.9 million in 2008 and 
2009, respectively. Meanwhile the corresponding values for EU 
exports were $8.5 million in 2008 and $4.4 million in 2009. 
These figures show that U.S. milk and cream powder products 
were negotiated more favorably than the same products sup-
plied by the EU.
Butter. More butter has been exported to Korea from the EU 
than from the United States.10 In 2009, Korea imported $2.3 
million in butter products from the EU, whereas it imported $0.7 
Table 2: Comparison of Sensitive Products in Korea’s Agriculture Tariff Reduction Schedules 
Product KORUS FTA Korea-EU FTA 
Rice Excluded Excluded 
Barley Malt (269%) and malting barley (513%) 15 year + ASG + TRQ 16 year + ASG + TRQ  
Unhulled (324%) and naked (299.7%) 15 year + ASG + TRQ Tariff remains 
Maize Popcorn (630%) 7 year + ASG 14 year 
For feeding (328%) Immediate 6 year 
Beans (urd, adzuki, mung) (420.8%, 607.5%) 15 year + ASG + TRQ 16 years 
Beef (40%) 15 year + ASG 16 year + ASG 
Pork Fresh or chilled (22.5%) 10 year + ASG 11 year + ASG 
Frozen (25%) 2016.1.1 11 year 
Milk 
products 
Milk powder (176%) and evaporated 
milk and buttermilk (89%) 
Tariff remains + TRQ Tariff remains + TRQ 
Food whey (49.5%) 10 year +TRQ 11 year + TRQ 
Cheese Cheddar (36%) 10 year + TRQ 10 year + TRQ 
Others (36%) 15 year + TRQ 16 year + TRQ 
Butter (89%) 10 year + TRQ 11 year + TRQ 
Natural honey (243%) Tariff remains + TRQ Tariff remains + TRQ 
Orange (50%) Seasonal tariff + TRQ Seasonal tariff + TRQ 
Grape (46%) Seasonal tariff Seasonal tariff 
Pepper Fresh, chilled, or dried (270%) 15 year + ASG Tariff remains 
Frozen (27%) 15 year 15 year 
Garlic Fresh, chilled, or dried (360%) 15 year + ASG Tariff remains 
Frozen (27%) 15 year 16 year 
Onion Fresh, chilled, or dried (136%) 15 year + ASG Tariff remains 
Frozen (27%) 12 year 13 year 
 
Source: Korean tariff schedules in both FTAs. 
Note: ASG = agricultural safeguard measures; TRQ = tariff rate quotas. 
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million of butter products from the United States. This fact 
is reflected the slightly more favorable in-quota quantity for 
the EU in TRQ. An aggregate 350 metric tons of originating 
goods from the EU in this category will be permitted to enter 
the Korean market duty-free from the first year. The in-quota 
quantity for the EU will increase gradually, and after 10 years 
every good in this category will be duty-free.
In the case of the United States, the in-quantity for the first 
year is 200 metric tons, and it will increase by approximately 
3 percent annually. After nine years, an unlimited quantity is 
eligible for duty-free import. The Korean duty of 89 percent 
on goods entered in excess of the quantities will be phased 
out gradually in both FTAs. It will be completely eliminated 
over 11 years in the case of the Korea-EU FTA and from 1 
January of year 10 in the case of the KORUS FTA. Given 
the import asymmetry from the United States and the EU, 
the Korean liberalization schedules seem more favorable to 
the United States.
Cheese products. Cheese will also be subject to TRQ in 
both FTAs.11 In the first year of KORUS FTA enforcement, 
U.S. cheese products will be imported duty-free up to 7,000 
metric tons. This in-quota quantity increases annually to 
10,280 metric tons in year 14, and after that there will be 
no limit in in-quota quantity. Meanwhile, cheddar cheese 
from the United States will no longer be subject to a TRQ 
beginning in year 10. Cheese products from the EU also will 
receive similar treatment, but with less in-quota quantity 
and a one-year-longer extension in limitation of in-quota 
quantity, including the case of cheddar cheese. The in-quota 
quantity of EU cheese products will be 4,560 metric tons 
in the first year and 6,696 metric tons as far out as the 15th 
year. Cheese goods entered in excess of the in-quota quantity 
will be duty-free from 1 January of year 15 in the case of 
the KORUS FTA and after 16 years in the case of the EU. 
Thirty-six percent of Korea’s duty on these products will be 
eliminated gradually over 15 years in the case of the KORUS 
FTA and 16 years in the case of the Korea-EU FTA. Even 
though the Korean import value of the products from the 
United States is higher than that from the EU, it is less than 
twice as large.12 Therefore, it is fair to say that U.S. cheese 
products received more favorable treatment than EU products 
in the FTA negotiations.
Natural honey. Natural honey is a product that is highly 
protected in Korea.13 Even though its current tariff rate is 243 
percent in Korea, U.S. exports of natural honey totaled more 
than $1.2 million in 2009, while the corresponding value is 
less than $100,000 for EU exports. The United States had a 
more favorable FTA negotiation in the area of natural honey 
than the EU. The first year in-quota quantity of the product 
will be 200 metric tons for the United States and 50 metric 
tons for the EU. Also, under the KORUS FTA the in-quota 
quantity reaches 225 metric ton in year five and after that 
increases by 3 percent per year, compounded annually. The 
in-quota quantity for the EU will increase annually up to 75 
metric tons in year 16, and after that it will remain the same 
as the quantity of year 16. The Korean duty on natural honey 
in excess of the in-quota quantities will remain at base rates in 
both FTAs.
Vegetable products. This category consists of products that 
are considered in Korea as containing the most sensitive items. 
Products in this category include edible vegetables, fruits, nuts, 
coffee, tea, cereals, and flours. Some Korean tariffs imposed on 
these products are amazingly high. For example, Korea imposes 
an 800.3 percent duty on some categories of cereals and a 754.3 
percent duty on red ginseng. Most Korean tariffs imposed on 
products in this category are higher than 25 percent and even 
higher than 100 percent in many cases. Several sensitive items 
are subject to TRQ and ASG, but there is a wide difference 
in terms of coverage of the KORUS FTA and the Korea-EU 
FTA. For example, oranges, malt, and malting barley are the 
only items that are subject to TRQ in the Korea-EU FTA. The 
KORUS FTA, however, includes fresh potatoes, barley, maize 
starch, soybean, ginseng, and fodder as additional items subject 
to TRQ. In the area of ASG, the KORUS FTA includes a much 
wider range of items than the Korea-EU FTA.
The wide differences in the treatment of TRQ and ASG in the 
FTAs are the result of trade asymmetry of U.S. exports and 
EU exports to the Korean market in certain categories. The 
United States exports approximately 10 times more vegetable 
products than the EU. In 2009, for example, the value of U.S. 
vegetable products exported to Korea was more than $2,524 
million, while the value of similar products exported by the 
EU to Korea was $272 million. Therefore, more U.S. vegetable 
products are subject to TRQ and ASG than EU products. In 
the case of oranges, the in-quota quantity in the first year is 
2,500 metric tons in the KORUS FTA compared with merely 
20 metric tons in the Korea-EU FTA. The quantity will reach 
2,814 metric tons in year five, and after that it will increase by 
3 percent per year, compounded annually, in the KORUS FTA. 
Meanwhile, the in-quota quantity will be 60 metric tons in year 
12, and after that it will remain the same as the quantity of year 
12 in the Korea-EU FTA. This difference also reflects the fact 
that recent annual orange exports of the United States and the 
EU to Korea were $73 million and $0.4 million, respectively. 
Other than that, most products in this category, including fresh 
grapes and apples, show similar Korean liberalization schedules 
in both FTAs.
Foodstuffs. The foodstuffs category consists of prepared meat, 
fish, vegetables, fruits, nuts, cereals, sugar, cocoa, beverages, 
spirits, vinegar, sugar, tobaccos. Korea has retained tariffs 
exceeding 20 percent on prepared foods, beverages, spirits, 
vinegar, and tobacco products. Around 25 percent of foodstuff 
items do not have similar Korean tariff reduction schedules 
in both FTAs. Except for some preserved fish and crustacean 
products, the United States will face a relatively slow tariff re-
duction schedule in Korea. For example, Korean tariffs on maple 
syrup (HSK 1702.20.2000) and noodle (HSK 1902.19.1000) 
will be eliminated immediately after the Korea-EU FTA enters 
into force, but elimination will take more than five years in the 
KORUS FTA. In the case of beverages of fruit juice (HSK. 
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2202.90.2000), the Korean tariff will be eliminated imme-
diately under the Korea-EU FTA, but over 10 years in the 
KORUS FTA. Meanwhile the United States received more 
favorable treatment than the EU in the products of preserved 
or prepared mackerel, anchovies, and other fish.
Overall assessment of the agriculture sector. Agriculture 
is the sector liberalizing the Korean market vis-à-vis the 
United States and the EU, and agricultural products show 
many differences under these FTAs. Overall, the EU seems 
to have achieved less in immediately opening the Korean 
agricultural market. The analysis of Korea’s tariff schedules 
in the KORUS FTA and the Korea-EU FTA shows that the 
negotiating efforts of the EU were concentrated in the area 
of foodstuffs.
Table 3 shows that the Korean tariff elimination schedule 
for EU agricultural exports is less favorable than the the 
schedule for U.S. exports. The percentage of immediate 
Korean tariff elimination is much lower for the EU than the 
United States by value, even though the reverse is true by 
item. Even after three years, the duty elimination schedule 
for EU agricultural exports is far behind that for the U.S. 
agricultural exports.
More detailed analysis, however, shows that there exist wide 
differences for each sector in opening the Korean market; see 
Table 4. The total scores are 38 and 4 in animal and animal 
products and in vegetable products, respectively. These results 
lead us to conclude that the EU had a less favorable outcome in 
both categories, especially in the category of animal and animal 
products. However, EU negotiators gained more in opening the 
Korean market in the area of foodstuffs. The total score in this 
area is -253, which shows a strong tendency to favor the EU 
exports more than the U.S. exports.
Animal and animal products are products for which the EU 
reached favorable tariff reduction outcomes in the Korean 
market in the Korea-EU FTA negotiations. EU exports of live 
animals such as ducks (HSK 0105.19.000), horses (HSK 
0101.10.0000), and rabbits and hares (HSK 0106.19.2000) are 
subject to immediate tariff elimination in the Korean market after 
the Korea-EU FTA goes into force. Meanwhile meat products 
are the area in which the EU had less favorable negotiation 
outcomes. The tariff on the belly part of frozen pork (HSK 
0203.29.1000), for example, will be phased out over 11 years 
for EU exports but from 1 January 2016 for U.S. exports. Given 
the small value of EU live animal exports to Korea and the huge 
Table 3: Comparison of Overall Agriculture Tariff Reduction Schedules in the KORUS FTA and 
the Korea-EU FTA, percentage of reduction 
 
Time frame 
KORUS FTA Korea-EU FTA 
Item Value Item Value 
Immediate 38.1 55.2 42.1 19.5 
Within 3 years 38.5 55.4 43.3 37.4 
Within 5 years 59.2 67.0 62.5 65.3 
 
Source: “The Detailed Explanation of Korea-EU FTA [in Korean],” Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Republic 
of Korea. 
Table 4: Comparison of KORUS FTA and Korea-EU FTA in Agriculture 
 
HS code1 Descriptions 
Number of 
items favorable 
to United States 
Number of 
items favorable 
to European 
Union Total score2 
01, 02, 04, 05 Animals and animal 
products 
50 11 38 
06–15 Vegetable products 81 46 4 
16–24 Foodstuffs 41 75 -253 
 
Source: Calculated from Korean tariff schedules in both FTAs. 
1 HS code = Harmonized Commodity Description and Coding System. 
2 Total score is calculated by summing up the year difference for each item in each of the 16 categories found in the 
tariff schedules for Korea in both the KORUS FTA and the Korea-EU FTA. The negative total score means that the 
EU had a favorable outcome in the sector. 
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amount of EU exports of the belly part of frozen pork to 
Korea, these results seem more to represent the Korea-EU 
FTA negotiating position of the Korean government.14
Trade data also support the claim that the EU achieved a 
more favorable outcome in foodstuffs but a less favorable 
outcome in both animal and animal products and vegetable 
products. It is plausible to think that when two countries 
that have similar levels of exports to an importing third 
country negotiate tariff reduction schedules with the im-
porting third country, the efforts of the negotiators of the 
exporting countries determine the outcome. This hypothesis 
and the fact that the exports of the United States and the 
EU to Korea are similar in both animal and animal products 
and foodstuffs, as shown in Table 5, lead to the conclusion 
that the EU negotiators put greater effort into opening the 
Korean market in foodstuffs and less effort into the area of 
animal and animal products. In the case of jams, jellies, and 
marmalades other than citrus fruit (HS 2007.99), the EU 
received more favorable treatment than the United States, 
even though it exports more of the product to Korea than 
the United States does.
Fishery Sector
The fishery sector was a highly sensitive one in both FTAs. 
Only 5 percent of items in this category are subject to 
immediate duty-free Korean market access. When we compare 
Korean tariff reduction schedules of both FTAs to find out which 
country gained more favorable access to the Korean market, the 
analysis would be inconclusive, as shown in Table 6. By value, 
the immediate tariff reduction rate is higher in the Korea-EU 
FTA. In three years, however, U.S. products are expected to 
receive more favorable treatment in the Korean market. The 
situation again reverses in five years.
The calculated total score for this sector favors the EU. Table 7 
also shows that the sum of the number of tariff items that favor 
only the United States or the EU is more than 100, which is 
more than half of the fishery items in Korea’s tariff schedule. 
Combining this result with the fact that more than half of the 
tariff items were negotiated differently in the KORUS FTA and 
the Korea-EU FTA, as shown in Table 1, we can conclude that 
the wide variety in Korean fishery tariff schedules in both FTAs 
is the result of the large number of different sensitive items in 
each FTA negotiation.
Table 8 shows the large asymmetry between U.S. and EU fish-
ery exports: the EU exports fishery goods five times less than 
the United States. This implies that the commercial interests of 
the EU in the fishery sector are less strong than in the United 
States. From the perspective of Korea, this means that, overall, 
the Korean fishery market is less sensitive to imports from the 
EU than to imports from the United States. Therefore, Korean 
Table 5: Comparison of Korea’s Agricultural Imports from the United States and the European 
Union, 2007–09, average, in U.S. dollars 
 
HS code1 Descriptions United States European Union 
01, 02, 04, 05 Animals and animal 
products 
561,337,591 458,369,253 
06–15 Vegetable products 3,077,305,784 231,743,749 
16–24 Foodstuffs 782,020,177 772,843,427 
 
Source: United Nations Commodity Trade Statistics Database (UN Comtrade), access date: 12 April 2011. 
1 HS code = Harmonized Commodity Description and Coding System. 
Table 6: Comparison of Overall Fishery Tariff Reduction Schedules in the KORUS FTA and the 
Korea-EU FTA 
 
Time frame 
KORUS FTA Korea-EU FTA 
Item  Value  Item  Value  
Immediate 14.2 1.5 12.3 6.8 
Within 3 years 54.9 38.9 44.2 27.1 
Within 5 years 62.5 64.8 67.2 78.0 
 
Source: “The Detailed Explanation of Korea-EU FTA [in Korean],” Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Republic 
of Korea. 
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negotiators might have more room to provide fishery tariff 
reduction schedules to EU counterparts with less worry 
about domestic resistance.
Manufacturing Sector
Even though the agriculture and fishery sectors are the most 
sensitive for Korea in both FTA negotiations, the dominant 
sector in Korean trade with the United States as well as the 
EU is manufacturing. This sector, however, is relatively less 
protected in Korea, and there are only a few sensitive items 
in manufacturing in both FTA negotiations. Among them, 
the most noticeable is automobiles. The United States and 
the EU have many interests in Korea’s auto market, and, as 
a result, Korea agreed to reform its domestic system as well 
as lower its tariffs in this sector.
Automobiles. The automotive trade has been a major 
contentious issue in Korea’s trade relations with the EU as 
well as with the United States, as South Korea has become a 
major producer and exporter of cars, especially smaller cars, 
and has attained expanding shares of the U.S. and European 
markets for passenger cars. Most of the changes in the new 
KORUS FTA of 2010 affect bilateral trade in autos and 
light trucks. Overall, FTA negotiations in this sector slightly 
favor the U.S. side rather than the EU side. This may reflect 
the stronger U.S. political pressures for better auto market 
access in Korea.
Tariff reductions. Both the first KORUS FTA and the re-
vised KORUS FTA provide a tariff reduction schedule that 
favors the United States by a little (Table 9). Compared with 
the six-year elimination schedule for the EU, for the United 
States the Korean tariff of 8 percent on U.S. passenger cars, 
including electric cars and plug-in hybrid cars, will be reduced 
to 4 percent immediately. But the 4 percent tariff will remain 
fixed until year five, when it is completely eliminated. Because 
the Korea-EU FTA is scheduled to go into provisional effect 
in July 2011, U.S. auto exporters will gain additional tariff 
advantage over European exporters the earlier the KORUS FTA 
enters into force.
U.S. exporters would have benefited more by the 2007 
KORUS FTA, which would have eliminated the Korean tariff 
on passenger cars immediately. The new KORUS FTA slows 
down tariff liberalization in both Korea and the United States. 
The United States has slowed its own tariff schedule on Korean 
passenger car exports and provides duty-free access for Korean 
autos beginning in year five. The EU provides a similar tariff 
liberalization schedule on passenger cars to Korea: its 10 percent 
tariff will be phased out over four or six years, depending on 
engine size. For light trucks, the United States also has a more 
favorable schedule: Korea provides immediate elimination of 
its 10 percent tariff for the United States but not for several EU 
truck exports.
Korean auto taxation. Taxes levied by Korea on autos is another 
area that Korea agreed to reform in the KORUS FTA. In addition 
to tariff liberalization, the Korean government agreed to revamp 
its engine displacement taxation system in the KORUS FTA, so 
that larger vehicles will not have to pay higher taxes. When the 
FTA goes into force, the special consumption tax on vehicles 
Table 7: Comparison of KORUS FTA and Korea-EU FTA in Fishery 
 
HS 
code1 Descriptions 
Number of items 
favorable to United 
States 
Number of items 
favorable to 
European Union Total score2 
03 Fish and crustaceans 55 53 -55 
 
Source: Calculated from Korean tariff schedules in both FTAs. 
1 HS code = Harmonized Commodity Description and Coding System. 
2 Total score is calculated by summing up the year difference for each item in each of the 16 categories found in the 
tariff schedules for Korea in both the KORUS FTA and the Korea-EU FTA. The negative total score means that the 
EU had a favorable outcome in the sector. 
Table 8: Comparison of Korea’s Fishery Imports from the United States and the European Union, 
2007–09, average, in U.S. dollars 
 
HS 
code1 Descriptions United States European Union 
03 Fish and crustaceans 112,272,909 21,930,179 
 
Source: United Nations Commodity Trade Statistics Database (UN Comtrade), access date: 12 April 2011. 
1 HS code = Harmonized Commodity Description and Coding System. 
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with engines of more than 2,000 cubic centimeters (cc) 
will be taxed at 8 percent instead of the current 10 percent. 
The rate, which is the same as the vehicles with engines of 
more than 1,000 cc, will be reduced to 5 percent within three 
years of the agreement going into force. Korea also agreed 
to amend its annual vehicle tax so that automobiles with 
engines of more than 1,600 cc are taxed at a single rate. This 
agreement is also applied to the Korea-EU FTA.
Safety standards. Safety standards were renegotiated 
between Korea and the United States in 2010. The new 
KORUS FTA accepts U.S. safety regulations for imported 
U.S. cars up to 25,000 vehicles per each U.S. automaker. 
Therefore U.S. exporters can sell annually in South Korea 
up to 25,000 vehicles built to U.S. safety standards without 
any additional modification. This limit is four times the level 
of 6,500 units permitted in the original FTA. This provision 
effectively grants mutual recognition to U.S. standards, 
since annual U.S. exports to Korea from all companies have 
averaged 5,000 to 7,000 cars.15 Meanwhile, the Korea-EU 
FTA takes a regulatory convergence approach based on 
the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe 
(UNECE) standards. It recognizes the World Forum for 
Harmonization of Vehicle Regulations within the framework 
of the UNECE as the relevant international standard-setting 
body for auto products and includes provisions in which both 
countries commit to harmonization of regulatory standards.
Fuel economy and greenhouse gas emission regulation. 
These environmental provisions made up another contentious 
area. In December 2010, the Korean government agreed that 
U.S. imports would comply with fuel economy and emissions 
standards if the cars did not exceed 119 percent of current Korean 
emissions limits from 2012 to 2015. By 2015, Korea will require 
automakers to reduce greenhouse gas emissions to 140 grams 
per kilometer and improve fuel economy to 17 kilometers per 
liter, which translates into an effective standard of 40 miles per 
gallon. Meanwhile, the U.S. standard will require automakers 
to achieve fleet averages of 36 miles per gallon by 2016.16 This 
agreement is also applied to the Korea-EU FTA through the 
most-favored nation (MFN) clause in the Korea-EU FTA.
Overall assessment of the manufacturing sector. Overall, 
the United States achieved more favorable FTA negotiation 
outcomes with Korea in the manufacturing sector in terms of 
immediate tariff reduction. As shown in Table 10, 81 percent 
of the U.S. manufacturing exports, compared with 70 percent 
of EU manufacturing exports, are subject to duty-free access 
to the Korean market once the KORUS FTA is enacted. After 
a five-year FTA enacting period, however, slightly more of the 
Table 9: Comparison of KORUS FTA and Korea-EU FTA in Automobile Tariff Reductions 
 
Type of vehicle KORUS FTA Korea-EU FTA 
Passenger cars (HS 8703) Reduce from 8% to 4% 
immediately and fully eliminate 
in year 5 
Eliminate over 6 years 
Electric cars; plug-in hybrids Reduce from 8% to 4% 
immediately and fully eliminate 
in year 5 
Eliminate over 6 years 
Light trucks Eliminate immediately Eliminate immediately or over 4 
or 6 years, depending on size of 
engine in light trucks 
 
Source: Calculated from Korean tariff schedules in both FTAs. 
Table 10: Comparison of Overall Manufacturing Tariff Reduction Schedules in the KORUS FTA 
and the Korea-EU FTA 
 
Time frame 
KORUS FTA Korea-EU FTA 
Item Value Item Value 
Immediate 89.9 81.0 90.7 69.4 
Within 3 years 96.2 94.3 95.8 91.8 
Within 5 years 98.1 95.8 99.5 98.7 
 
Source: “The Detailed Explanation of Korea-EU FTA [in Korean],” Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Republic 
of Korea. 
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EU manufacturing exports will be permitted to enter into 
Korea free of customs duties.
Item-by-item analysis reveals a wide variety of favorable 
treatments among subsectors of manufacturing. Table 
11 shows that the EU carried out a more favorable FTA 
negotiation in the areas of chemicals and allied industries, 
plastics and rubber, wood and wood products, textiles, 
and machinery and electrical products. The United States 
achieved a more favorable tariff reduction schedule in the 
areas of raw hides, skins, leather, furs, and transportation.
Chemicals and allied industries have a high absolute value 
in total score (see Table 11) and similar export values for 
both the United States and the EU, as shown in Table 
12. This implies that the different Korean tariff reduction 
schedules in this category would be the result of strong EU 
interest in the Korea-EU FTA negotiations in this category. 
This is also true in the areas of plastics and rubber, textiles, 
and machinery and electrical products. Meanwhile, the EU 
has a less favorable tariff reduction schedule in the areas 
of raw hides, skins, leather, and furs, and in transportation. 
Those are the sectors that show little difference in the export 
values of the U.S. and the EU goods to Korea. Therefore, 
we can conclude that the Korean sensitivity in these sectors 
is reflected in the Korea-EU FTA.
Services Sector
Korea provides significant improvements in several of 
the services sectors in both FTAs. These sectors include 
legal services, accounting services, taxation services, 
telecommunications, audiovisual services, and financial 
services. Although most Korean services sector liberalization 
schedules were treated similarly in both FTAs, audiovisual 
services are excluded in the Korea-EU FTA. Meanwhile the 
EU has more favorable results in the areas of environmental 
services and cross-border supply of television and radio signals 
transmission services through satellite facilities.
Professional services. Among professional services, legal 
services are one of the important areas in which Korea agreed to 
expand market access for U.S. service providers. Korea prohibits 
foreign law firms from opening offices in Korea, forming part-
nerships with Korean law firms, and recruiting Korean lawyers 
to provide so-called multijurisdictional services. No later than 
the date the KORUS FTA enters into force, Korea will allow 
U.S. law firms to establish representative offices in Korea and 
provide legal advisory services. No later than two years after 
that, Korea agreed to allow U.S. law firms to enter into specific 
cooperative agreements with Korean law firms in order to be 
able to jointly deal with cases where domestic and foreign legal 
issues are mixed and to share profits derived from such cases. 
No later than five years after the date the agreement enters into 
force, Korea will allow U.S. law firms to establish joint venture 
firms with Korean law firms and employ Korea-licensed lawyers 
as partners or associates. This commitment was also provided 
to EU law firms in the Korea-EU FTA. The agreement to open 
Korean markets to accounting and taxation services was set up 
similarly to legal services in both FTAs.
Telecommunications. Korea provided important commitments 
that will ensure expanded access for U.S. service providers to 
the Korean telecommunication market. Currently a Korean law 
Table 11: Comparison of KORUS FTA and Korea-EU FTA in Manufacturing 
 
HS 
code1 Descriptions 
Number of 
items favorable 
to the United 
States 
Number of 
items favorable 
to the European 
Union Total score2 
25–27 Mineral products 14 8 1 
28–38 Chemicals and allied industries 30 142 -453 
39–40 Plastics and rubber 34 42 -84 
41–43 Raw hides, skins, leather, furs 29 1 77 
44–49 Wood and wood products 42 73 -201 
50–63 Textiles 5 28 -93 
64–67 Footwear and headgear 2 0 8 
68–71 Stone and glass 36 32 23 
72–83 Metals 36 39 26 
84–85 Machinery and electrical 45 177 -562 
86–89 Transportation 71 11 269 
90–97 Miscellaneous 33 41 -34 
 
Source: Calculated from Korean tariff schedules in both FTAs. 
1 HS code = Harmonized Commodity Description and Coding System. 
2 Total score is calculated by summing up the year difference for each item in each of the 16 categories found in the 
tariff schedules for Korea in both the KORUS FTA and the Korea-EU FTA. The negative total score means that the 
EU had a favorable outcome in the sector. 
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allows foreign ownership of up to 49 percent of total voting 
shares. In the KORUS FTA, Korea relaxed the foreign own-
ership requirements and allowed 100 percent indirect owner-
ship two years after the entry into force of the FTA, except 
for the ownership of two major Korean telecommunication 
service providers, KT and SK Telecom Co., Ltd. (SK Tele-
com). This commitment was also included in the Korea-EU 
FTA for EU telecommunication service providers.
Audiovisual services. Before entering the FTA negotiation 
with the United States, Korea cut by half the screen quota—
to 73 days per year at each screen—that is applicable to the 
theatrical exhibition of U.S. motion pictures. The KORUS 
FTA also contains Korea’s commitments to decrease the 
domestic content quotas applicable to the broadcast of films 
and animation programming. It also increases the U.S. quota 
applicable to single-country sources of foreign content 
broadcast in Korea. More than that, no later than three years 
after this agreement enters into force, Korea will permit 100 
percent foreign ownership of a program provider that is 
not engaged in multi-genre programming, news reporting, 
or home shopping. The Korea-EU FTA does not have any 
provisions on audiovisual services.
Overall assessment of the services sector. Korea agreed 
to open its market substantively in the areas of professional 
services, telecommunications, audiovisual services, and 
financial services. In the area of financial services, all fi nan-
cial firms from the United States and the EU will be able to 
freely transfer data from their branches and affiliates to their 
headquarters. The United States and the EU have similar FTA 
preferences in each FTA negotiation with Korea.
In the case of audiovisual services, the lack of interest by the 
EU was reflected in the FTA negotiations. The sectors in which 
the EU made progress in opening the Korean market compared 
with U.S. progress are environmental services and satellite 
broadcasting services. In environmental services, Korea received 
commitments on the treatment of nonindustrial wastewater: no 
later than five years after the Korea-EU FTA enters into force, 
Korea will grant nondiscriminatory treatment to EU service 
suppliers in competition procedures for management contracts. 
In addition, Korea will permit EU service providers to supply 
cross-border television and radio signal transmission services 
through satellite facilities without commercial arrangements 
with Korean suppliers no later than two years after the Korea-
EU FTA enters into force.
Kaesong Industrial Complex
The Kaesong industrial complex (KIC) is the result of the Sun-
shine Policy of previous South Korean administrations. The 
KIC is located in North Korea but is only a one-hour drive from 
Seoul. It opened in 2004 after the pilot phase of construction 
was completed in June 2004. The KIC is run by a South Korean 
committee that has a 50-year lease that began in 2004.17
Unlike the previous FTAs that Korea concluded, including with 
Singapore, EFTA, ASEAN, and India, the KORUS FTA and the 
Korea-EU FTA do not provide preferential treatment for products 
Table 12: Comparison of Korea’s Manufacturing Imports from the United States and the European 
Union, 2007–09, average, in U.S. dollars 
 
HS code1 Descriptions United States European Union 
25-27 Mineral products 1,511,323,441 484,346,776 
28-38 Chemicals and allied industries 4,215,848,702 4,898,201,118 
39-40 Plastics and rubber 1,119,128,771 1,013,627,000 
41-43 Raw hides, skins, leather, and furs 367,621,202 446,857,653 
44-49 Wood and wood products 1,016,230,166 494,895,988 
50-63 Textiles 353,663,536 779,287,875 
64-67 Footwear and headgear 12,819,791 95,334,590 
68-71 Stone and glass 505,188,049 583,866,802 
72-83 Metals 3,146,606,792 3,159,701,990 
84-85 Machinery and electrical 12,236,397,110 13,082,248,618 
86-89 Transportation 2,333,665,543 3,004,896,468 
90-97 Miscellaneous 3,674,044,209 2,415,056,053 
 
Source: United Nations Commodity Trade Statistics Database (UN Comtrade), access date: 12 April 2011. 
1 HS code = Harmonized Commodity Description and Coding System. 
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made in the KIC.18 Instead, both agreements took a similar 
approach by establishing procedures for future consideration 
of trade preferences to apply to goods produced in the KIC. 
Both FTAs establish a Committee on Outward Processing 
Zones (OPZs) on the Korean Peninsula. The committee 
will review whether conditions on the Korean Peninsula 
are appropriate for further economic development through 
the establishment and development of OPZs. Specifically, 
the committee will (1) identify geographic areas that may 
be designated OPZs, (2) establish criteria that must be met 
before goods from any OPZ may be considered originating 
goods for both agreements, (3) determine whether any such 
OPZ has met the criteria established by the committee, and 
(4) establish a maximum threshold for the value of the total 
input of the originating final good that may be added within 
the geographic area of the OPZ.
Although the Korea-EU FTA is mute about the criteria for 
evaluating whether goods produced in OPZs are eligible for 
FTA preferences, the KORUS FTA provides some examples 
of them. Those include progress toward the denucleariza-
tion of the Korean Peninsula and the impact of the OPZs on 
(1) intra-Korean relations, (2) environmental standards, (3) 
labor standards and practices, (4) wage practices, and (5) 
business and management practices prevailing in the OPZs, 
with due reference to the situation prevailing elsewhere in 
the local economy. The criteria also include the relevant 
international norms.
In the KORUS FTA, however, the committee decisions 
regarding extending FTA preferences to OPZs are not self-
executing. FTA eligibility for goods produced in OPZs 
would require amendments to the agreement, which are 
subject to legislative approval in both countries. Meanwhile 
the Korea-EU FTA does not have provisions that explicitly 
require legislative approval in providing FTA eligibility for 
goods produced in OPZs.
Conclusions
The prospect of ratification of the KORUS FTA in the U.S. 
Congress is still unclear. Given that the Korea-EU FTA will 
take effect from 1 July 2011, this dim prospect provides 
fading and lost opportunities for the U.S. exporters to Korea. 
The Korean tariff reduction schedules for U.S. exporters are 
more favorable in the areas of animal and vegetable products 
and transportation. But these advantages will fade as the 
enforcement of the KORUS FTA is delayed. Meanwhile, 
disadvantages for U.S. exporters in the areas of foodstuffs, 
chemicals, machinery, and electronics will increase. The 
more delay the KORUS FTA experiences, the more the 
opportunities will fade for U.S. exporters. Also, because 
there is no way that the KORUS FTA will be enacted before 
the Korea-EU FTA, there are already lost opportunities for 
U.S. investors. In services and investment, the KORUS 
FTA provides MFN treatments for any developments in the 
future. U.S. investors might have had MFN treatment in the 
areas of environmental services and television and radio 
signals transmission services through satellite facilities, but this 
opportunity is surely lost.
In conclusion, the United States has more favorable treatment 
in meat and vegetable products and transportation, while the 
EU has better treatment in processed foods, chemicals, and 
machinery. The large difference in outcomes in animal and 
animal products between the KORUS FTA and the Korea-EU 
FTA can be ascribed to the the reflection of greater sensitiv-
ity of the Korean market in this sector in the Korea-EU FTA 
compared with the KORUS FTA. Therefore the EU received a 
less favorable tariff reduction schedule than the United States 
in this area. This is true in the areas of raw hides, skins, leather, 
and furs, and transportation.
We have the opposite case, however, in the foodstuff sector: the 
many differences in Korean tariff liberalization schedules in the 
U.S. and European FTAs could be a result of the reflection of the 
EU positions, which preferred earlier tariff eliminations on many 
items in the Korea-EU FTA. This is also true in the manufactur-
ing sectors such as chemicals and allied industries, plastics and 
rubber, textiles, and machinery and electrical products.
In vegetable products, the large difference in Korean tariff 
schedules when both FTAs are compared would be due to the 
asymmetry that exists in the exports of the United States and 
the EU. Therefore, the U.S. and EU exports of many different 
vegetable products to Korea are reflected in the differences 
between these FTA negotiations. The same is also true for the 
fishery and manufacturing sectors in categories such as mineral 
products, footwear and headgear, stone and glass, metals, and 
miscellaneous.
Despite these agreements being very similar, the specific dif-
ferences highlighted in this paper demonstrate the different 
approaches toward market access in Korea in certain trade 
areas. Yet the overall differences could change with the delay 
of ratifying the KORUS FTA. Thus, it is necessary to focus on 
the differences from the perspective of market access in Korea, 
illustrating the priorities for the United States and the EU when 
dealing with South Korea.
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16. Ibid.
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Korean Industrial Complex, Report no. RL34093 (Washington, D.C.: 
Congressional Research Service, 18 April 2011), 11.
18. Previous FTAs provided preferential treatment to some products made 
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Endnotes
1. Detailed explanations of the KORUS FTA can be found at “Korea-
U.S. FTA,” Korea Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, www.
mofat.go.kr/english/econtrade/fta/Concluded/US/index.jsp; and at 
“Korea-U.S. Free Trade Agreement,” Office of the United States 
Trade Representative, www.ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-
agreements/korus-fta.
2. Detailed explanations of the Korea-EU FTA can be found at 
“Korea-EU FTA,” Korea Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, www.
mofat.go.kr/english/econtrade/fta/Concluded/EU/index.jsp; and at 
“EU-Korea Free Trade Agreement Online, European Commission, 
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/press/index.cfm?id=443.
3. There are not many studies on the comparison between the KORUS 
FTA and the Korea-EU FTA. As far as I know, William H. Cooper, 
Remy Jurenas, Michaela D. Platzer, and Mark E. Manyin, The EU–
South Korea Free Trade Agreement and Its Implications for the 
United States, Report no. R41534 (Washington, D.C.: Congressional 
Research Service, 5 January 2011), is the only one that provides a 
comparison between them. But, unlike this study, it focuses only on 
some specific items.
4. Chapter 97 is the last one; Chapter 77 is reserved for future in-
ternational use.
5. In doing so, it is assumed that the KORUS FTA is enacted one 
year later than the Korea-EU FTA.
6. Beef in this category is covered as follows: HSK (HS code 
of Republic of Korea) provisions 0201.10.0000, 0201.20.0000, 
0201.30.0000, 0202.10.0000, 0202.20.0000, and 0202.30.0000.
7. Pork in this category is covered as follows: HSK provisions 
0203.19.1000 and 0203.19.9000.
8. For other parts of frozen pork, Korean tariffs will be phased out 
over six years for EU exports and completely eliminated beginning 
1 January 2016 for U.S. exports.
9. Milk and cream powder products in this category are covered as 
follows: HSK provisions 0402.10.1010, 0402.10.1090, 0402.10.9000, 
0402.21.1000, 0402.21.9000, 0402.29.0000, 0402.91.1000, 
0402.91.9000, 0402.99.1000, 0402.99.9000, and 0403.90.1000.
10. Butter products in this category are covered as follows: HSK 
provisions 0405.10.0000, and 0405.90.0000.
11. Cheese products in this category are covered as follows: 
HSK provisions 0406.10.1000, 0406.20.0000, 0406.30.0000, and 
0406.90.0000 (which includes cheddar cheese).
12. In 2009, Korea imported $37.5 million in cheese products from the 
United States and $32.2 million in cheese products from the EU.
13. HSK provision for this product is 0409.00.0000.
14. This item is the single largest export to Korea in the agriculture 
sector, and the EU export value of this item to Korea was more than 
$225 million in 2009.
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